INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY: DE VOS VERSUS ZILLE
By: Gareth van Onselen
Introduction
It is very unusual for an academic (and certainly a law academic) to make as many logical errors as are committed in this particular piece and it is for that reason I have decided to use it to illustrate some of the (logical) shortcomings often involved in constructing a coherent argument. Because, if a senior academic can make these mistakes, anyone can, and it is useful to identify and explain them.
The piece in question is the third in an exchange between DA leader Helen Zille and Pierre de Vos, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of the Western Cape (and part-time political commentator). And I would recommend reading it in full, before continuing with this article. It is not my intention to involve myself directly in that exchange, rather to simply analyse the logic used in the piece to illustrate some broader problems (for Zille’s side of the argument, see here).
Nor is this response meant to be comprehensive, there are numerous other mistakes in De Vos’s piece, which I have not identified here, as space does not allow. Here then are four logical errors from De Vos’s response to Helen Zille.
Example 1: Inconsistently applied principles
The first example is fairly straightforward. De Vos contests Zille’s claims that she has been vindicated by a city-appointed commission by arguing that: “it is true that a Commission headed by a senior advocate cleared Zille and the DA of wrongdoing. But the terms of reference of this Commission were decided on by Helen Zille herself, and she was thus cleared of what she knew beforehand she would be cleared. The terms of reference of the Erasmus Commission are much wider, and thus have the potential to uncover evidence of wrongdoing not covered by the Zille Commission.”
Put another way, De Vos contends that Zille set up a commission with limited terms of reference because she knew - within those terms - she had done nothing wrong, and thus it would inevitably clear her, which is what it did. Thus, De Vos argues, she should not oppose a broader provincially-appointed commission as it might uncover wrongdoing missed or outside the mandate of the city-appointed commission.
Implicit in this line of reasoning is a certain amount of guilt on the part of Zille - she acted to limit a probe which could potentially undercover corruption (and is thus trying to prevent a more comprehensive one). He also implies that the city-appointed commission was set up to serve a political purpose - to clear Zille and, therefore, that it is essentially dishonest because, according to De Vos, it had limited terms of reference and thus did not constitute a full and proper investigation.
(Remember, although I contest De Vos’s assertion, I am not providing a response to it here - that Helen Zille’s office can do - I am merely analysing the use of logic.)
In principle, then, De Vos asserts that the city-appointed commission served a political purpose (to clear Zille) as opposed to a principled purpose (to establish the truth). But De Vos does not use this principle consistently, and this undermines the coherence of his argument.
If one accepts that a commission can be established to serve a political motive, as De Vos implies is the case with Zille, then one must also accept that a different commission set up by a different politician could also have been established to serve a political motive (albeit a different one).
To disprove that it was, one would then have to turn to the evidence. This might vary in strength and prove that one or both or neither were established with a particular political motive, but the principle would have been evenly applied and a comparison then done on the weight of the evidence.
| Posted on 25/4/2008
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